In March 2024, the House of Representatives embarked on the crucial task of crafting the Fiscal
Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a landmark piece of legislation that
would shape the future of U.S. defense policy and spending. With tensions simmering on
multiple fronts and the global security landscape evolving rapidly, lawmakers have faced
significant challenges.
Discussions within the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and its subcommittees
centered on key priorities and areas of focus for the FY2025 NDAA. Among these were the
NATO Security Investment Program and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Between the
FY2023 and FY2024 NDAAs, the former saw a 63.4% in spending from 210 million to 343
million USD. In the same timeframe, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative was cut from 800
million to 300 million USD, a 62.5% decrease.
House Speaker Mike Johnson’s tenuous hold over the speakership may prove a pivotal factor in
the FY2025 spending deal—particularly provided the growing power of the Freedom Caucus in
directing the House GOP provided Johnson’s razor-thin majority.
The FY2025 NDAA deliberations in the House also reflected a growing recognition of the need
to address strategic competition with near-peer adversaries, notably China and Russia.
Lawmakers scrutinized proposals aimed at bolstering U.S. military posture and capabilities in
key regions, enhancing deterrence, and countering adversarial actions across multiple domains.
Discussions also encompassed efforts to strengthen alliances and partnerships, promote burdensharing
among allies, and counter malign influence activities aimed at undermining U.S. interests
and values.
In addition to modernization and strategic competition, the House considered measures to
enhance military readiness and sustainability, with a focus on improving service member
welfare, healthcare, and quality of life. Proposals to invest in training and education, optimize
force structure, and modernize logistics and supply chain management garnered attention as
lawmakers sought to ensure that the military remains capable of meeting its operational
commitments while safeguarding the well-being of its personnel.
Low recruitment numbers may also prove a pivotal issue. During Fiscal Year 2023, the
Department of Defense (DoD) reported that it had underperformed in recruiting by 41,000
personnel. Rep. Mike Garcia (R-CA-27), a former Navy officer, remarked: “This isn’t just a
money, pay, salary issue, it’s quality of life at the base and in the barracks,” according to Stars
and Stripes.
Discussions within the House of Representatives underscored the importance of defense
innovation and collaboration with the private sector. Lawmakers explored ways to incentivize
research and development, streamline acquisition processes, and foster public-private
partnerships to harness the full potential of emerging technologies and maintain the U.S.
military’s technological edge. Initiatives aimed at promoting diversity and inclusion in the
defense workforce also featured prominently, reflecting a commitment to harnessing the talents
and perspectives of all Americans in service of national security.
The future of the FY2025 NDAA remains to be seen. How the new strategic problems faced by
the United States will be tackled—including Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea—could be
heavily shaped by the 2024 elections in November. Stay tuned with the Bamford News Network
for more information.

President Emmanuel Macron is considering sending French troops to Ukraine. Vladimir
Putin’s response? Watch out—or else risk nuclear war.
On February 27, Macron stated that “no option should be ruled out” in Western
assistance to Kyiv, including the deployment of French ground forces. Putin was quick to retort,
“[The West] must realize that we also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory. All this
really threatens a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of civilization.
Don’t they get that?”
Should push come to shove, how likely is it that nuclear war would break out? What
would this conflict look like, and what role might the United States play? Despite Putin’s threats,
the potential for a large-scale nuclear exchange is negligible.
First, we must clarify and define nuclear warfare. There exist two overarching classes of
nuclear weapons: tactical and strategic. The former consists of warheads with a blast yield
between 0.3 and 50 kilotons of TNT; the latter of warheads with a yield between 100 and 1,000
kilotons of TNT. The purpose of tactical nuclear weapons is to achieve localized battlefield
victory, whereas the purpose of strategic nuclear weapons is the large-scale destruction of
civilian and military infrastructure. The popular conception of an apocalyptic nuclear exchange
Putin evoked is strategic—not tactical—nuclear warfare. If Putin were to employ a nuclear
weapon, the most probable scenario would be in a tactical capacity against Ukrainian ground
forces. This conclusion is justified twofold.
First, Russian tactical nuclear weapons exploit, to quote Former Admiral Charles Richard
of U.S. Strategic Command, a “deterrence and assurance gap based on the threat of limited
nuclear employment.” The United States’ tactical nuclear arsenal is practically nonexistent.
Moreover, the United States has no legal grounds on which to credibly deter Russian tactical
nuclear weapon use; the relatively low yield blast would have no impact on neighboring NATO
countries, and the United States has no mutual defense agreement with Ukraine to this effect. It
is plausible that deployment of a tactical nuclear weapon would incur no direct military response
from the United States or any NATO member state, including France.
Second, using a strategic nuclear weapon against Ukraine—or against a NATO ally—is
entirely irrational. Putin invoked the concept of mutually assured destruction. A Russian strategic
nuclear weapon deployed in Ukraine (particularly Putin’s new RS-28 Sarmat ICBM with
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) would likely affect surrounding NATO
member states, giving the United States grounds on which to deploy its strategic nuclear arsenal.
Striking a NATO member state would have the same effect.
The point is this: the sort of nuclear weapon which would start World War Three will not
be used in Ukraine or against a NATO member state. Sending conventional weapons to Ukraine
or deploying French troops will not prompt Putin to nuke downtown Chicago. Putin seeks
battlefield victory in Ukraine, not the destruction of the Russian Federation. Simply put, use of a
strategic nuclear weapon, even should Western presence in Ukraine increase, is unconducive to
his objectives.
There is indeed a very real possibility that Putin will use a tactical nuclear weapon in
Ukraine. The solution, however, is not to appease the Kremlin and curb aid to Kyiv. History has
shown a policy of appeasement to be a losing strategy. In fact, we ought to do the exact opposite:
confront Putin directly. Authoritarian actors only understand hard power. NATO conventional
forces in Ukraine will not start a Third World War. Putin is a dictator, not an idiot.